At the same time, many facilities still use foreign solutions, primarily hardware and software-hardware. Some of them, as Maxim Chernov emphasiz ,, are us , in 90% of continuous production, and it is impossible to quickly find a domestic replacement for them. Accordingly, it is necessary to develop parameters of trust for such systems. For example, can software creat , in friendly countries or only by a Russian company be consider , trust ,, or is it necessary only in Russia, is government control necessary and if so, in what form (certification, standardization). According to Maxim Chernov,

this will facilitate the transition to Russian software.

 in cyber security for industrial automation systems and smart devices at Kaspersky ICS CERT, gave several examples united kingdom phone number library   of how products that seem to meet all the criteria for Russian software, but have foreign components “under the hood.” At the same time, Russian vendors have not eliminat , vulnerabilities, including critical ones. When the researchers point , out the unpatch , vulnerabilities to the vendor, they fail , to establish communication.

According to Maxim Chernov, the F

eral Service for Technical and Export Control (FSTEC) is doing a lot of work to ensure trust, but it is impossible to close the entire front of 50,000 critical information infrastructure facilities using only the regulator’s efforts. He veronika saldana  propos , creating an industrial association under the auspices of information security professionals. It will help not only the companies that own critical information infrastructure european leads facilities, but also their suppliers and contractors, among whom there are many companies with a low information and cybersecurity culture, and attacks through suppliers are extremely common.